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This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players
select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom is that when agent’s
interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively competitive: “keeping up with the Jones’ ”
lowers everyones’ welfare. Here, we study the long-run consequences of imitative behavior when
agents have suﬃciently long memories — and the outcome is dramatically diﬀerent. Imitation
robustly leads to cooperative outcomes (with highest symmetric payoﬀs) in the long run. This
provides a rationale, for example, for collusive cartel-like behavior without collusive intent on the
part of the agents.
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How does cooperation arise in competitive environments where agents’ interests conﬂict? One answer to
this question is that repeated interaction sustains cooperation — cooperation on a period-by-period basis
is justiﬁed by the need to maintain working relationships. Thus, rational agents with precise knowledge of
their environment optimize over time with a web of threats and rewards sustaining cooperative behavior.
But, in complex strategic environments, agents may have little faith in their ability to predict the
behavior of others and may have limited ability to determine what constitutes a “good decision”. In such
circumstances, the levels of rationality and knowledge mandated by traditional game theoretic models
seem implausible — presupposing, as it does, that individuals have full knowledge of the environment,
have the ability to anticipate how others will behave, and are capable of making diﬃcult computations.
Concerns such as these have given rise to learning-based models that attempt to provide insight into
individual behavior under plausible requirements on agents’ ability to reason in and fully understand,
the environment in which they function.
This paper takes such an approach and shows how cooperation arises naturally from imitation of
successful behavior by agents who have limited information and limited computational ability. It is
accepted wisdom that in competitive settings, imitative behavior typically leads to destructive competi-
tion.1 Underlying such results is the fact that learning from experience directly or indirectly gives rise to
comparisons of relative payoﬀs, so the criterion for evaluation of choices is diﬀerent from that of payoﬀ
maximization. And, for a large class of environments, there is a natural competition between agents:
the expansion of activity by one tends to depress the payoﬀs of others in relative terms so that the new
activity level is vindicated by comparison. In this way, a slow incremental deterioration in welfare can
go undetected, but ultimately lead to a large drop in welfare, as imitative behavior promotes excessive
activity, depressing the welfare of all. In short, “keeping up with the Jones’ ” ends up leading to the
worsening of the Jones’ welfare.
These observations raise a signiﬁcant concern with the use of imitation as a behavioral dynamic;
agents should come to realize that “upward matching” of the actions of others is counter-productive.
However, when individuals cannot recall and evaluate the performance of past actions, the process can
go unnoticed, with payoﬀs declining, period by period. In contrast, when they have suﬃcient memory,
they can observe the eﬀect of destructive imitation through the evaluation of payoﬀ averages over some
period of time. This crucial feature provides an environment where cooperative behavior is sustainable.
In essence, individuals have “long enough” to evaluate the performance of diﬀerent actions. We develop
these issues in an environment where agents recall a history of actions of ﬁnite length and the payoﬀs
associated with these actions. Agents imitate successful past behavior and this generates dynamics on
a state space of ﬁnite histories leading naturally to the study of the long-run behavior of the process.
In this long-run setting, it seems plausible that the actions agents take should somehow be justiﬁed
1See Matros and Josephson (2004), Vega-Redondo (1997) and Al´ os-Ferrer (2004).
1over time and with experience. Having agents evaluate an action through its historical average per-
formance over time does precisely this — they may attach a degree of conﬁdence in the reliability of
expectations concerning the value of a given action. Our analysis shows that this conﬁdence is justiﬁed
and experience-based judgment turns out to be supported by fact: choices, which agents through expe-
rience come to believe are good, do yield high payoﬀs. When long histories are observed, agents see the
destructive consequences of “ratchet” imitation — in contrast to when memory is short so that trends
cannot be detected. Not only does this longer view moderate destructive competition, but imitation can
also form the basis for cooperative or collusive behavior. In particular, for a broad class of environments,
when recall is suﬃciently good, the unique stochastically stable outcome with imitation is the maximally
collusive outcome (the monopolistic outcome in oligopoly contexts).
There is ample psychological evidence that imitative behavior of the sort that we model is common
(see, e.g., Kahneman et al. (1997)’s review of experimental work on how recalled utility aﬀects individual
action choices). Also, this model of imitative behavior has a substantial degree of internal consistency.
In the long run, imitating the success of others turns out to produce success for the imitator. The
individual follows a pattern of behavior—imitation—and the evidence supports that behavior. Further-
more, although imitative behavior is myopic in the sense that agents do not try to predict the behavior
of others and optimize against the prediction, a “sophisticated” agent may be unable to exploit the my-
opic behavior of others. Although a sophisticated player may be able to increase own current payoﬀ by
changing action, this would cause others to imitate the successful behavior, and continue to imitate until
the payoﬀ performance of the new choice dropped below the initial status quo, so that the sophisticated
player’s gain is completely eroded.
The classes of environment considered here are those in which there is strategic covariation of payoﬀs
and strategies. With complementarities, higher actions of another player raise one’s payoﬀ and best
response; and with substitutes, higher actions of another player lower one’s payoﬀ and best response.
We use the tools of stochastic stability to study the dynamic evolution of behavior. Few assumptions are
imposed on the structure of the stochastic components of the model because, in this framework, virtu-
ally any model of experimentation used to identify stochastically stable states leads to the same general
conclusion of long-run cooperative behavior. The key insight in the relevant analysis is that the length
of memory plays a crucial role because the “size” of the basins of attraction of diﬀerent states varies with
memory length. In comparing two long-run absorbing states, increasing the length of memory increases
the relative size of the basin of attraction of the most “collusive” state. As a result, lengthening memory
leads to the stochastically stable states being the most collusive or cooperative ones. And, because it is
the length of memory rather than the speciﬁc model of experimentation that generates this eﬀect, the
model of experimentation is largely irrelevant to the prediction of the long-run steady state.
The next section describes the model. Section 3 formulates imitative behavior and details how error
and experimentation are introduced into the framework. Section section 4 analyzes long-run dynamic
behavior, and presents the results described above. Section 5 considers variations on the imitation rule
2to emphasize the robustness of the general point being made; and section 6 concludes.
2 The Model, Notation and Assumptions
In each period, each of n identical agents chooses an action from a common ﬁnite set of z actions,
X = fx1,...xzg, with representative element x. The strategy spaces is ordered so that x1 < ... < xz.
Write Xn to denote the n-fold product of X, and denote an action proﬁle by x 2 Xn. For notational
emphasis, we sometimes write the action proﬁle x = (x1,...,xn) as (xi,x−i) in order to highlight the ith
component, where xi is the choice by agent i and x−i is the n  1 vector of choices by the other agents.
The payoﬀ to i at action proﬁle (xi,x−i) is given by πi(xi,x−i). Payoﬀs are assumed to be symmetric
in the sense that there is a function π : Xn ! R such that for any i, we have πi(xi,x−i) = π(xi,x−i). At
a symmetric action proﬁle where xi = xj = x for all i and j, write π∗(x) = π(x,x,...,x), where π∗ : X !
R. Payoﬀs are assumed to be strictly increasing for x < xm and strictly decreasing for x > xm. That is,
xm is the “most collusive” choice; it is the unique solution to maxx π∗(x). In an oligopoly setting, xm
corresponds to the equal ( 1
nth) share of the monopoly output. Given a vector x = (x1,x2,...xi,...xn),
emphasize the impact of i’s action on diﬀerent agents’ payoﬀs by writing (x1,x2,...[xi]i,...xn). We
consider environments in which actions are either substitutes or complements.
Deﬁnition 1 Actions are substitutes if (a) actions are strategic substitutes—best-response functions are
monotone decreasing—and (b) an action increase by one agent lowers the payoﬀ of other agents: if j 6= i,
xj > 0, and ˜ xi > xi then πj(x1,...,[˜ xi]i,...,xn) < πj(x1,...,[xi]i,...,xn).
Actions are complements if (a) actions are strategic complements—best-response functions are monotone
increasing—and (b) an action increase by one agent raises the payoﬀ of other agents — if j 6= i, xj > 0,
and ˜ xi > xi then πj(x1,...,[˜ xi]i,...,xn) > πj(x1,...,[xi]i,...,xn).
Many familiar economic models ﬁt into this framework. For example,
 The traditional oligopoly model has preferences πi(xi,x−i) = p(
Pn
j=1 xj)xi   c(xi), where p() is
the inverse demand and c() is a ﬁrm’s cost function.
 The tragedy of the commons has preferences V (
P
j xj)xi  v(xi), where xi is the number of owner
i’s sheep and V (
P
xj) is the gain to having another sheep on the commons when there are already
P
xj sheep there.




j xj) is total output,
which depends on group eﬀort; w(Q) is the wage, which is a function of output; and v(xi) is the
disutility attached to eﬀort xi.
3Denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium action choice by xN. We assume that if every player is playing
a common choice below the Nash equilibrium strategy, then a player can gain by raising their action;
and conversely if everyone is selecting a strategy above the Nash level it pays to reduce one’s action:
(i) If x < xN, for x < ˜ xi  xN, then πi(x,x,...,[˜ xi]i,x,...,x) > π∗(x);
(ii) if x  xN, for xN  ˜ xi < x, then πi(x,x,...,[˜ xi]i,x,...,x) > π∗(x).
This assumption ensures that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. At a common choice below
xN, a small increase in agent i’s action raises own payoﬀ; while at a common choice above xN, small
reductions in action raise payoﬀs. To avoid confusion, the paper primarily focusses on the substitutes
case. A parallel analysis holds for the complements case. One result, theorem 4 is stated for both cases.
3 Behavior: Experience-Based Choices and Experimentation.
As already described, the model of behavior is one in which individual choices are based on experience:
information from past choices and payoﬀ consequences is used to guide current choice. In particular,
to implement these experience-based choice rules, agents need not know the detailed structure of the
environment in which they operate, nor do they need to understand the motivations of other individuals.
We next describe the decision-making process. Following that, we introduce a general model of exper-
imentation and error. Experimentation and error, in combination with imitative-based choice, govern
the step-by-step movement of the system and its long-run dynamic behavior.
3.1 Experience-Based Choices
Agents observe the actions taken by other agents and the associated payoﬀs. At the beginning of each
date t+1, an agent can recall the actions and payoﬀs for the past l+1 periods, t,t 1,...,t l. Because
actions uniquely determine payoﬀs, we conserve on notation and write the state or recalled history of the
economy as a n  (l + 1) vector of choices made by agents in the previous l + 1 periods. In each period
individuals observe the choices made and the rewards received; but they may not know how choices
determine payoﬀs, i.e., they may not know the payoﬀ functions.
At the beginning of date t + 1, the state is given by s = x(t) = (xt−l,...,xt−1,xt), where xτ 2 Xn
is an n vector of choices by agents, and t   l  τ  t. Denote the set of states by S. Given a state
s = x(t), let X(s) = fx 2 X j 9i, t   l  τ  t, x = xi
τg, so that x0 2 X(s) if at state s some player in
the history identiﬁed by s chose x0.
At date t, given the state x(t), considering the average historical performance of each choice, denote
the average payoﬀ from the choice x at state s by ¯ π[x : s], calculated by averaging over those periods in
which x was chosen and can be recalled. Let Tt(x j x(t)) = fτ j t   l  τ  t, 9j, xj
τ = xg be the set
of times at which some agent chose x. At each t0 2 Tt(x j x(t)), let k(x,t0) be an arbitrary agent who
4played x at that date (symmetry across agents implies that in any period where agents made the same
choice, they received the same payoﬀ). The payoﬀ to those agents, including k(x,t0), who chose x at




t ). The average payoﬀ from action x over the memory frame is therefore











If both x and x0 are in X(s), then both are in the memory frame and may be compared by all agents.
Because agents who take the same action in a period receive the same payoﬀ, results are unchanged if
the average is taken over agents as well as time periods.
Agents select choices based on average historical performance: in a stationary environment, it is
reasonable to suppose that lessons learned from one period are no more or less valuable than those
learned in other periods, in which case experiences from diﬀerent periods should be weighted equally.
In fact, it is important for the results that more recent payoﬀs from an action be weighted at least as
heavily as more distant experiences (so that the eﬀects of imitation are quickly recognized). Formalizing
previous discussion, agents select actions from the set B(x(t)) of choices that yielded the highest average
historical performance, where
B(x(t)) = fx 2 X(x(t)) j ¯ π[x;x(t)] = max
x0∈X(x(t))
¯ π[x0;x(t)]g.
Represent agent i’s action choice by a distribution bi(x j x(t)) on the set of actions, X. The next
deﬁnition formalizes the idea that agent i makes choices based on comparison of actions from the set of
best historical performers.
Deﬁnition 2 Agent i optimizes imitatively according to bi if at every state s = x(t), bi( j x(t)), the
choice of action for period t + 1 has support B(x(t)).
For generic payoﬀs, bi( j x(t)) puts probability 1 on a single point—and in such an event, we denote
that point by bi(x(t)) 2 X.
The next section describes the way in which error is added to the choice procedure. This model
of error or experimentation in conjunction with (imitative) optimizing behavior determine the dynamic
evolution of the system.
3.2 A General Model of Error and Experimentation.
At any state of the system each individual recalls the history of actions x(t) and corresponding payoﬀ pro-
ﬁles, and with this information has an intended choice, xi. For all individuals, the intended action proﬁle
is x = (x1,x2,...,xn). We postulate a general model evolution and experimentation in which exploration
of alternatives relative to this action, or errors in choice, is formulated as a distribution ϕ that selects
5the intended action with high probability, but also gives some weight to the selection of other actions.
Deﬁnition 3 A mapping ϕθ is a model of experimentation and/or error if for each (x,x(t)), ϕθ is a
distribution (parameterized by θ) on Xn = X  X   X, (n times) satisfying:
1. For all ˜ x 2 Xn, ϕθ(˜ x j x,x(t)) > 0.
2. ϕθ(x j x,x(t))  1 and ϕθ(x j x,x(t)) ! 1 as θ ! 0.
In words, at (x,x(t)), every point in Xn has positive probability, but most of the probability mass is
placed on the point x. Experimentation or error is represented by the distribution ϕθ. Absence of
such experimentation corresponds to deterministic selection of the intended choice by each individual,
which may be represented by the distribution ϕ∗, where ϕ∗(x j x,x(t)) = 1,8x 2 Xn. Thus, ϕθ is
approximately equal to ϕ∗ and ϕθ ! ϕ∗ as θ ! 0. Because X is ﬁnite, we have ϕ
θ  min˜ x,x,x(t) ϕθ(˜ x j
x,x(t)) > 0, and ϕθ  max˜ x,x,x(t) ϕθ(˜ x j x,x(t))  ϕ
θ. Because mutation or experimentation is
infrequent, ϕθ is small. For reasons discussed in Bergin and Lipman (1996), it is assumed that there




ϕθ is bounded by some constant, for θ small: the rates of error or
experimentation in diﬀerent states cannot diﬀer by an inﬁnite number of orders of magnitude.
This formulation imposes few assumptions on experimentation and error. Experimentation may de-
pend on the state (history) x(t), and may be correlated across individuals. For example, suppose that
experimentation depends on the state, s, own choice prior to experimentation, xi, and some publicly
observed random variable, ω with distribution ν: ϕi
θ(˜ xi j ω,xi,s). Then the distribution over choices is
given by








θ(˜ xi j ω,xi,s)ν(dω).
With independent experimentation across individuals, ϕθ has the form: ϕθ(˜ x j x,x(t)) = n
i=1ϕi
θ(˜ xi j
xi,x(t)), where x = (x1,x2,...,xn) and ˜ x = (˜ x1, ˜ x2,..., ˜ xn).
Further, when for each player, a common choice xi 2 X is the intended action, we can represent state-
independent uniform experimentation over alternatives with small probability θ using the multinomial
distribution. For example, given the current state, suppose that each individual plans to choose the
same action, xi, next period. In this case, player i chooses xi next period with probability (1   ˆ zθ),
and xj with probability θ, j 6= i, where ˆ z = z   1 (recalling that z is the number of possible choices or
elements of X), so that










k=1 ni = n.
The system evolves from period to period in two steps. First, choices are made, and then a random
component impacts decisions (with small probability), to produce next period’s state.
63.3 Dynamics under Selection and Experimentation
Combining fbign
i=1 and ϕθ determines a Markov process on the state space. If x = (x1,...,xn), let
b(x j x(t)) = n
i=1bi(xi j x(t)). With experimentation, the distribution over X is given by:
pθ(x0 j x(t)) =
X
x∈Xn
ϕθ(x0 j x,x(t))b(x j x(t)), 8x0 2 Xn.
Letting x(t) = (xt−l,xt−l+1,...,xt), the state x(t+1) = (xt−l+1,...,xt,x0) has probability pθ(x0 j x(t)),
so that the transition probability on the state space is Pθ(x(t + 1) j x(t)) = pθ(x0 j x(t)). Because the
Markov chain is irreducible, it has a unique invariant distribution, which we denote by µθ.
With dynamics determined by this process, long-run behavior is considered in terms of the proportion
of time spent in each state. The transition matrix is Pθ = fPθ(˜ s j s)g˜ s,s∈S. In the long run, iterates
of the transition matrix Pθ converge (P t
θ ! P ∗
θ as t ! 1) with a corresponding limiting invariant
distribution on states, µθ: µθPθ = µθ. The long-run probability of state i is µθ(fsig). We denote the
state at time t by s(t) and index the set of times at which players move by T = f0,1,...g. Deﬁne
Ti = minft 2 f1,2,...g j s(t) = sig and Ti = 1 if s(t) 6= si, 8t  1: for any realization of fs(t)g∞
t=0,
Ti  1 gives the smallest positive integer (if one exists) at which the state s(i) is reached. Conditional
on s(0) = si, Ti gives the ﬁrst return time to state si; and EfTi j s(0) = sig is the expected return
time to state si, and is related to µθ(fsig) according to the formula µθ(fsig) = 1
E{Ti|s(0)=si}. Thus, if
µθ(fsig)  1, then with high probability the system stays there, so that EfTi j s(0) = sig  1.
4 Long-Run Outcomes
The following discussion focuses on the long-run behavior of the system from two perspectives. First
section 4.1 shows that that when the level of perturbation of the system through error or experimentation
is small, in the long run, the system spends most of the time in the collusive state s∗. Then, in
section 4.2 taking the rate of error or experimentation as ﬁxed, we derive the impact of lengthening
memory. Speciﬁcally, we prove that lengthening memory raises the average frequency of time spent in
the collusive state — longer memory promotes greater cooperation. With a ﬁxed experimentation rate,
the fraction of the time spent in non-collusive absorbing states goes to 0 as memory length increases.
4.1 The Stochastically Stable State
Stochastic stability concerns the behavior of the distribution µθ as θ ! 0. The concept has been utilized
extensively in economics since its use by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). Assuming
µθ converges, say to µ, a state s 2 S is called stochastically stable if it is in the support of the limit, µ.
In the speciﬁc case where the support of the limiting distribution contains a single point or state, this
7implies that in the long run, in the perturbed system most of the time the system is in that state, and
so it is the appropriate long-run prediction. In what follows, assume that payoﬀs are generic, so that in
computing ﬁnite averages, there are no payoﬀ ties comparing diﬀerent actions.2
Theorem 1 For generic payoﬀs, if the length of memory is suﬃciently large, then the unique stochas-
tically stable state is s∗ = (xm,...,xm).
Proof: All proofs are in the appendix.
The exact structure of the error or experimentation process matters little for this result. What is
central to this result is (1) that the stochastic stability criterion introduces perturbations in behavior
which leads to comparison of alternative choices, and (2) the comparisons following experimentation
are based on the average performance of diﬀerent actions. Because the collusive choice has the highest
average, once this is played for a suﬃciently long period of time, it becomes more diﬃcult to “dislodge”
as the preferred choice. Apart from possible gain on introduction, new alternatives perform less well
than the collusive outcome, averaged over long enough a period of time. For the same reason, multiple
innovations in choice apart from the collusive choice average down over time, and again, if memory
is long enough, are discarded in favor of a return to the collusive choice. Furthermore, the longer is
memory, the more pronounced is this fact. The contrast between this predicted collusive outcome and
the standard prediction of the Walrasian outcome is sharp. What drives the latter prediction (see Bergin
and Bernhardt (2004)) is that comparisons are based on the best recalled historical performance of an
action: individuals never revisit the value of an action, if subsequently that action performed less well.
But as Kahneman et al. (1997)’ experimental evidence makes clear, individuals do recall and weight
more recent experiences in addition to peak performances. Eﬀectively, such weighting underlies this
result, and the conclusion highlights how this central prediction is, in fact, reinforced when more recent
experiences from an action are weighted more heavily in decision making.
The following simple duopoly example illustrates the impact of comparisons based on average per-
formance. We explicitly calculate how long memory has to be to support the monopoly outcome. The
example highlights that memory recall does not have to be very long to support collusive behavior.
2Consider the action x ∈ X. Let {x
−i
α } be an enumeration of points in Xn−1. For a history of length r, the ﬁnite set
of possible average payoﬀs associated with x is
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8A Duopoly Example. Consider a duopoly model with three choices — M, N or W, where M denotes






M (6,6) (3,7) (2,4)
N (7,3) (4,4) (1,2)





To discuss the long-run dynamics, suppose that experimentation is independent with each agent ex-
perimenting independently with probability  in each time period. Thus, the probability that both
experiment in any period is 2, which is approximately the probability that exactly one individual ex-
periments in each of any two periods, (2(1   ))2.





τ is the choice
of i in period t. Under imitative dynamics only monomorphic states (where agents take the same action
over time) can be stable, so it is suﬃcient to restrict attention to such states. Consider a history of the
form [(M,M),...,(M,M),(M,M)] after which experimentation switches player 2’s choice to N — so
that next period’s history is [(M,M),...,(M,M),(M,N)]. The average payoﬀ to M is l
l+16 + 1
l+13,
and the average payoﬀ to N is 7. Imitation leads player 1 to switch to N, leading to the history,
[(M,M),...,(M,M),(M,N),(N,N)]. At this point, with l observations on M the average payoﬀ to
M is l−1
l 6 + 1
l3 and the average payoﬀ to N is 1
27 + 1
24 = 11
2 . Hence, the average performance of M
is better than N if l−1
l 6 + 1
l3 > 11
2 , which holds if l > 6. If two players experiment simultaneously,
yielding history [(M,M),...,(M,M),(N,N)], then reversion to M is immediate. If experimentation
occurs twice, one after the other, then history [(M,M),...,(M,M),(M,N),(N,M)] can arise (where
M and N are matched twice), and without further experimentation both now play N. One period later,
the average payoﬀ to M is l−2
l 6 + 2
l3, whereas the average payoﬀ to N is 7, and both players choose
N. Two periods later, the history becomes [(M,M),...,(M,M),(M,N),(N,M),(N,N),(N,N)]. The
average payoﬀ from M is l−3
l−16+ 2
l−13 = 6l−12
l−1 , and the payoﬀ from N is 1
4(7+7+4+4) = 11
2 . Reversion
by both players to l occurs if 14l−10
l−1 > 11
2 , which holds if l > 13.
Now consider the constant Nash history, [(N,N),...,(N,N),(N,N)]. Experimentation to M by one
player leads to [(N,N),...,(N,N),(N,M)] followed by reversion to [(N,N),...,(N,N),(N,N)], as M
produces a lower average payoﬀ than N, so that reversion to N occurs. However, if both experiment
with M, the history becomes [(N,N),...,(N,N),(M,M)], and because the average from M is higher,
both play M thereafter. Similar calculations apply when the choice of W occurs. Thus, if agents can
recall at least 14 periods, the unique stochastically stable outcome has both players choose M.
Note that in the case where players have just two strategies, fM,Ng, the game is a Prisoner’s dilemma
game and the same reasoning gives fM,Mg, the cooperative outcome, as the long-run outcome.
94.1.1 Long-Run Outcomes: Local Experimentation
In this framework, one can consider local experimentation where only actions in a neighborhood of a
choice are tested. Let d(xi) be the largest action less than xi and u(xi) be the smallest action larger
than xi, according to the ordering on X. Given x 2 Xn, deﬁne N(x) = f˜ x j ˜ xi 2 fd(xi),xi,u(xi)gg,
Experimentation is local if it involves moving up or down to an adjacent action, so that ϕθ( j x,x(t)) has
support N(x). We next prove that argument underlying Theorem 1 holds when experimentation is local.
Theorem 2 Suppose that experimentation is local and the memory length is suﬃciently long. Then the
unique stochastically stable state is s∗ = sxm = (xm,...,xm).
The next section considers the impact of lengthening memory. The analysis is complicated by the
fact that increasing memory length changes the state space. For this reason, it is more convenient to
focus on basins of attraction, because with long memory, a state may involve long “strings” of collusion
or cooperation, without being the (unique) cooperative state.
4.2 The Impact of Lengthening Memory
With memory length l, a state of the system at time t is given by s = x(t) = (xt−l,xt−1,xt), a vector
of the current and l previous periods of the history. The state of the system associated with collusion is
s∗ = (xm,...,xm), where xm is repeated l+1 times. For ﬁxed l, suﬃciently large, our previous analysis
revealed that when for each x, the distribution ϕθ( j x,x(t)) puts most of the weight on x, then the
state s∗ is occupied a large fraction of the time. The maximum error rate or rate of experimentation
is bounded above by ϕθ: 8(x,x(t)), for x0 6= x, ϕθ(x0 j x,x(t))  ϕθ, so the average time between
experimentation or choice error is at least 1/ϕθ. Under this perturbed system, the invariant distribution
is µθ and from the earlier discussion, µθ(fs∗g) ! 1 as θ ! 0. To emphasize the memory length, write
s∗
l instead of s∗, let Q(s∗
l ) be the basin of attraction of s∗
l in the unperturbed system with memory
length l, and let Qc(s∗
l ) be the complement of Q(s∗
l ). Finally, write µl
θ for the corresponding invariant
distribution of the perturbed system with memory length l and perturbation parameter θ. The following
theorem shows that as the length of memory increases, the time spent at the collusive state or in its
basin of attraction converges to 1. Because experimentation or error rates are constant over time, over
a period of time of 1/ϕθ, on average, experimentation will occur so that within the basin of attraction
there is a lower bound on moving from one state to another. Nevertheless:
Theorem 3 With the rate of experimentation ﬁxed suﬃciently small (ϕθ a ﬁxed small number), the
share of total time spent in the basin of attraction of the collusive outcome converges to 1 as the memory












10When the error or experimentation rate is ﬁxed at some small positive level, the system will move
from one state to another over time — it cannot settle down in any state. And, for ﬁxed experimentation
rate, as memory becomes longer, experimentation is more likely to occur over the time frame of memory
length. But, starting from the collusive monomorphic state, as memory length increases, the probability
of leaving the basin of attraction of the collusive state goes to 0. In essence, there is more time to “wash
out” experiments and subsequent behavior, then returning to collusive behavior with the higher recalled
average payoﬀ. To move the system to a diﬀerent basin of attraction requires repeated experimentation
of suﬃcient frequency relative to the memory length in order to “purge” memory of the high payoﬀ
collusive behavior. In contrast, from a non-collusive monomorphic state, experimentation which achieves
the collusive per period action proﬁle is immediately adopted and the the system is in the basin of
attraction of the collusive state in one step. Now, additional shocks are required to prevent the system
from moving to the collusive state. Again, the key point is not the role of the error-experimentation
process, but rather that fact that long memory makes it more diﬃcult to dislodge high payoﬀ collusive
behavior from memory, and once reached, it becomes the benchmark for judging other choices.
5 Other Learning Rules.
Throughout, our analysis has considered the “learning rules” rule of selecting the best historical per-
former and we have shown that it leads to collusive behavior. At the other end of the spectrum, one
can consider the rule of avoiding the worst average historical performer. We next make the central point
that even with this very “weak” improving criterion of avoiding worst performing actions, there is still
considerable drift to cooperative behavior in the long run. To simplify the discussion, we focus on exper-
imentation that is independent across individuals and independent of the state, using the formulation
mentioned in section 3.2, where an individual chooses the intended strategy with probability (1   ˆ zθ),
and each alternative with probability θ.
A minimal requirement for reasonable learned behavior is that agents not choose the worst historical
outcome whenever there is a better alternative. The worst-performingchoice solves: minx0∈X(x(t)) ¯ π[x0;x(t)].
If not all choices yield the lowest payoﬀ, let
S(x(t)) = fx 2 X(x(t))j¯ π(x;x(t)] > min
x0∈X(x(t))
¯ π[x0;x(t)]g
be the set of actions with average payoﬀs that strictly exceed the minimum. If the average payoﬀ to every
action chosen is the same (because every action that can be recalled yielded the same historical average
performance), then let S(x(t)) correspond to the set of actions that have been played in the last l + 1
periods: S(x(t)) = fx 2 X(x(t))g. Write S for the class of S’s that satisfy these conditions. A minimal
restriction on agent behavior is that an agent not select a worst performer, when that is possible:
Deﬁnition 4 Agent i avoids worst choices according to imitation criterion S 2 S if at every state s =
11x(t), his action choice for period t+1 is drawn from a probability distribution γi(s) with support S(x(t)).
As before, the error-experimentation process is applied to this selection procedure. The key point of
the next theorem is that, even with this minimal requirement, substantial cooperation arises in the long
run. In the statement of Theorem 4 xm+1 is the smallest action choice exceeding the collusive action
level xm, and XN+1 is the smallest choice exceeding the Nash action level xN.
Theorem 4 Suppose that l is large, and agents optimize imitatively according to some S 2 S. Then if
actions are substitutes, the set of stochastically stable states is a subset of fxm,xm+1,...,xNg. If actions
are complements the set of stochastically stable states is a subset of fxN,xN+1,...,xmg.
To see what underlies this result, consider a homogeneous oligopoly and suppose that the system is
at rest at some output level between Cournot and Walrasian. Now consider the impact of perturbing
the output of some ﬁrm. First consider a small increase in the output by ﬁrm i. Relative to the initial
quantity, i’s proﬁt is below the status quo proﬁt, because the status quo output exceeded Cournot. In
the period following the perturbation, i’s proﬁt exceeds that of other ﬁrms whose proﬁt was depressed
by the increase in i’s output. But when this lower proﬁt of the other ﬁrms is averaged over all periods
in which the status quo output was chosen, the single period has a small impact on the average. In
contrast, i’s proﬁt has fallen relative to the average. Hence, this upward perturbation in output is not
adopted. Now suppose i’s output drops a small amount. Then, i’s proﬁt rises, and the proﬁt of the
other ﬁrms from playing the status quo, averaged over those periods in which the status quo was played,
is approximately unchanged. Hence, the average proﬁt from the lower output exceeds the proﬁt from
the status quo output. As a result, all ﬁrms adopt this lower output level. This further raises the proﬁt
obtained from output reduction, so this lower output persists.
6 Conclusion
The results in this paper show that long memory in conjunction with imitative behavior supports max-
imally cooperative or collusive behavior. But even when recall is short, so that the scope for a ‘good”
(cooperative) action to be recognized as good in terms of payoﬀs is limited, some cooperative behavior
can arise as long as memory is non-trivial. To see this, consider the oligopoly setting with the shortest
non-trivial memory of two periods, and suppose that the output choice grid is suﬃciently ﬁne. Then it
can be shown that the stochastically stable outputs are strictly between monopoly and the Walrasian
or fully competitive output with price equal to marginal cost. Suppose that the system is at rest at the
Walrasian output. But then a slight reduction in one ﬁrm’s output raises the proﬁt of ﬁrms producing
the Walrasian output relative to the experimenting ﬁrm, but by a factor of less than two. Hence, when
the payoﬀ from the Walrasian output is averaged over time, it is less than the proﬁt accruing to the
experimenting ﬁrm. Conversely, monopoly cannot be sustained because it takes more than two periods
12to learn that a slight upward experimentation is unproﬁtable: at xm, ∂π
i
∂xi jxm=  (n   1)∂π
j
∂xi jxm> 0,
where n is the number of ﬁrms.
The analysis has assumed that agents weight experiences in diﬀerent periods from the same action
equally. This makes sense in a stationary environment. Still, it may be reasonable to suppose that payoﬀs
from more recent actions are weighted more heavily, because agents suspect that the environment broadly
interpreted as reﬂecting the actions of other agents may have changed. To make this transparent, consider
an oligopoly setting and suppose that only the most recent experience from an action is weighted. A
moment’s reﬂection reveals that it now only takes a memory of three periods to support the monopoly
outcome. To see this, suppose that the system is at the collusive outcome, and someone proﬁtably
experiments with increased output. Then, in the next period, everyone imitates this increased output,
reducing everyone’s proﬁt below the monopoly levels. Since ﬁrms now only weight recent experiences
from an action, they immediately return to the monopoly output level, which they still recall. Conversely,
suppose that the system is at rest at outputs above monopoly, and all ﬁrms experiment with monopoly.
Then it is adopted and retained. Thus, weighting recent payoﬀs from actions more heavily is very
diﬀerent from having a trivial memory.
Finally, we have supposed that individuals select those actions that yielded the best average histor-
ical performance. Over time, the consequence of this is to generate collusive behavior. Consider the
alternative model of behavior in which some agents optimize explicitly. Although except in special cases,
it is diﬃcult to examine the dynamics when one player best responds against the imitative rule, it is
worth noting in the substitutes model that the eﬀect of best responding in the state s∗ is to raise the
choice level of others, as they imitate the best response choice. As a result, the gain from best responding
is eroded subsequently as other players imitate. In turn, it can sometimes be optimal for a “rational
player” to act as an imitator, when others are also doing so.
7 Appendix
Theorem 1 For generic payoﬀs, if the length of memory is suﬃciently large, then the unique stochas-
tically stable state is s∗ = (xm,...,xm).
Proof: Call an action proﬁle x = (x1,...,xn) monomorphic if xi = xj for all i,j. A state
s = (xt−l,...,xt) is a monomorphic state if there is a monomorphic proﬁle x such that xt = xt−j,
j = 0,...,l. For x 2 X, write sx to denote the monomorphic state associated with x. Under the
unperturbed dynamic, ϕ∗, all non-monomorphic states are transient and every monomorphic state is
absorbing: if the system is at a monomorphic state, then it stays in that state thereafter. Thus, if ˆ µ is
an invariant distribution of Pϕ∗, then it has support on the set of monomorphic states.
Now, consider the dynamics under ϕθ. Suppose that x 6= xm and let sx be the associated monomor-
13phic state. Under ϕθ experimentation occurs with small probability. Let xm = (xm,...,xm) and
x = (x,...,x), and by assumption, we have ϕθ(x j x,sx)  1 and ϕθ(xm j x,sx)  ϕ
θ. But, because
x 6= xm, we have π∗(x) < π∗(xm), so that with probability of at least ϕ
θ, all players switch to xm: in the
absence of further error or experimentation the system moves in l periods to state s∗ = (xm,...,xm).
Next, consider the situation where the system is in state s∗ = (xm,...,xm). Suppose now that the
system is perturbed so that some ˜ x 6= (x,...,x) is drawn (according to the distribution ϕθ(˜ x j xm,s∗)).
Next period the history or state has the form s0 = (xm,...,xm, ˜ x). Comparing points in ˜ x = (˜ x1,..., ˜ xn),
suppose without loss of generality that the choice by player j of xj = ˆ x gave the highest payoﬀ, and write
˜ x = (ˆ x, ˜ x−j. If π(ˆ x, ˜ x−j) < π∗(xm), then reversion to xm is immediate, because the average payoﬀs of
actions other than xm are based on the one period of observation. If, instead, π(ˆ x, ˜ x−j) > π∗(xm), then
all players switch to ˆ x next period, so that the payoﬀ to each player is π∗(ˆ x), and the average payoﬀ
to ˆ x is 1
2[π(ˆ x, ˜ x−j) + π∗(ˆ x)]. If ˆ x is chosen for q subsequent periods, then the average payoﬀ to ˆ x is
1
qπ(ˆ x, ˜ x−j) +
q−1
q π∗(ˆ x). If ˆ x was the only choice in the list ˜ x with payoﬀ above π∗(xm), then compare
this with the payoﬀ from xm. Depending on whether xm was in the list ˜ x, the average payoﬀ to xm
is either π∗(xm) or 1
l+1π(xm, ˜ x−i) + l
l+1π∗(xm). Because π∗(ˆ x) < π∗(xm), and l is (suﬃciently) large
relative to q, 1
qπ(ˆ x, ˜ x−j) +
q−1
q π∗(ˆ x) < minfπ∗(xm), 1
l+1π(xm, ˜ x−i) + l
l+1π∗(xm)g. Taking q1 to be the
smallest integer such that this inequality holds, reversion to xm occurs after q1 periods. If there was
more that one point in ˜ x with payoﬀ above π∗(xm) they are played in order, moving down successively
from one to the next as the average payoﬀs fall: each can be played only for a ﬁxed number of times
before the average payoﬀ is below π∗(xm). With l suﬃciently large reversion to π(xm) eventually occurs.
Suppose that experimentation occurs at multiple time periods, ˜ x(1),... ˜ x(k) at t0 < t1 <  < tk




r=1 πr + l−k
l π∗(xm)  π∗(xm), when l is large and xm is matched with actions other than xm
on k occasions.
From the previous paragraph, there is a ﬁxed length of time following the draw of ˜ x(0), before
reversion to s∗ occurs, absent further perturbations. If further perturbations occur suﬃciently quickly,
t1 “close” to t0, other actions may be played for a period of time until averages drop below competing
choices that arose from the perturbation, or else below π(xm). If ti+1 ti is larger than some number, qi+1
say, reversion to xm occurs between ti and ti+1, so that players are playing xm when the perturbation
associated at ti+1 occurs. In this case, the discussion proceeds as above. To prevent reversion to xm in
the time interval from t0 to tk it must be that q =
Pk
r=1 qk > tk t0. But if l is suﬃciently large relative
to q, if there are no further perturbations after the kth, then reversion to xm occurs. For any k, there
is an l suﬃciently large such that k perturbations in any order disturb the system, but it subsequently
reverts to xm in the state s∗.
Thus, for any k, there is an l such that k perturbations will not move the system from state s∗: any
k perturbations leave the system in the basin of attraction of the state s∗ in the unperturbed system ϕ∗.
14Note that because ϕ
θ and ϕθ are small positive numbers, for some integer k, ϕk
θ < ϕ
θ. If k is chosen to
satisfy ϕk
θ < ϕ2
θ, then the probability of escaping the basin of attraction of state s∗ is an (ϕ
θ) order of
magnitude smaller than that of moving from any monomorphic state to s∗.
Theorem 2 Suppose that experimentation is local and the memory length is suﬃciently long. Then the
unique stochastically stable state is s∗ = sxm = (xm,...,xm).
Proof: The proof follows directly from the proof of theorem 1. Speciﬁcally, given x 2 X, x > xm,
x = (x,...,x) 2 Xn and x0 = (d(x),...,d(x)) 2 Xn is reached with probability ϕ
θ > 0. Taking k such
that ϕk
θ < ϕ
θ, the same calculations as above show that the system has a higher probability of moving
down from x than up.
Theorem 3 With the rate of experimentation ﬁxed suﬃciently small (ϕθ a ﬁxed small number), the
share of total time spent in the basin of attraction of the collusive outcome converges to 1 as the memory












Proof: With S the set of states, and ˆ s 2 S, an ˆ s-tree is a collection of ordered pairs, h = f(s, ˜ s) j (s, ˜ s) 2
S Sg such that for every s 2 S n ˆ s there is a unique successor (some s0 such that (s,s0) 2 h); and ˆ s has
no successor. Let Hl
ˆ s be the set of all ˆ s-trees, where the memory length is l. Letting qh = (s,s0)∈h pθ
ss0,
from the Markov chain tree theorem, the relative probability of s0 to s00 in the invariant distribution is











qh. For ease of notation in what follows write µ instead of µl
θ,
always bearing in mind that the invariant distribution µ depends on both l and θ. Similarly, write ϕ
and ϕ instead of ϕθ and ϕ
θ.
Because there are z monomorphic states, there is an s∗-tree h, such that qh  O(ϕz−1). (The
notation O(x) denotes “of order of magnitude x” — the ratio of the term to x is bounded.) Consider
a memory of length l and state ˆ s that is absorbing under the unperturbed system. Then the state, ˆ s,
is monomorphic so that for some x 2 X, x = (x,x,...,x) and ˆ s = sx = (x,...,x); and let h 2 Hˆ s.
Consider the experimentation or error that produces the movement ˆ s   (x,...,x;xm) = ˆ s1. Let ˆ sr
denote the state with a history of xm in the most recent r periods and x in the l + 1   r periods prior
to that. Then, absent further shocks to the system, the system moves deterministically according to the
sequence ˆ s1 ! ˆ s2 !  ! ˆ sl+1 = s∗. Under the structure of error-experimentation, pθ
ˆ sˆ s1 is bounded
below by ϕ; and for r = 1,...,l, pθ
ˆ srˆ sr+1 is of order 1: pθ
ˆ srˆ sr+1 = O(1) (i.e., pθ
ˆ srˆ sr+1  1). Consequently,
l
r=0pθ
ˆ srˆ sr+1  O(ϕ), taking ˆ s0 = ˆ s. The same reasoning applies to each (monomorphic) absorbing state
diﬀerent from s∗. Let SM  S be the set of monomorphic states, and let S∗
M = SM  S n fs∗g be the
set of monomorphic states, excluding s∗. The set of non-monomorphic states, S nSM can be partitioned
15into (disjoint) sets such that for each state, s, in a given element of the partition there is a collection
of distinct states, fsjgJ
j=1 with s = sj, sJ = ˆ s and psjsj+1 = O(1). For each ˆ s 2 Sm n fs∗g, the chain
ˆ s = ˆ s1 ! ˆ s2 !  ! ˆ sl+1 = s∗ provides weight of order ϕ to the s∗-tree; transient states provide
weight of order 1. Because there are (M) monomorphic states, this construction yields an s∗-tree, h,
with qh  O(ϕz−1).
Next, consider an s-tree for some s 2 S∗
M. Each of the z   2 states in S∗
M n fs∗g is absorbing
in the unperturbed system. From the previous discussion, for any such state the perturbation ˆ s  
(x,...,x;xm) = ˆ s1 starts a process that terminates at s∗. The probability of this in the perturbed system
has order of magnitude bounded above by ϕ. Now, consider state s∗ and the number of perturbations
required to reach the basin of attraction of an alternative monomophic state. Recall from theorem 1
that for any k, there is a memory length l(k) such that k perturbations in any order over l periods
do not move the system out of the basin of attraction of s∗. In the s-tree, the chain connecting s∗
to s, f˜ sjgm
j=1 with s∗ = ˜ s1,..., ˜ sm = s has the property that m
j=ipθ
˜ sj˜ sj+1  O(ϕk), so a bound on













is ﬁxed, as k increases (with corresponding increase in
memory length), we have
µ({s})
µ({s∗}) ! 0. Furthermore, for any state, s0 in the basin of attraction of s, and
any state ˜ s in the basin of attraction of s∗, Q(s∗) such that more than k perturbations is required to
leave Q(s∗), the same inequality holds:
µ({s
0})
µ({˜ s})  αl ! 0 as l ! 1.
The state space may be partitioned into a collection of basins of attraction, one for each monomorphic
state. Write fl
j for the fraction of all states associated with monomorphic state j, denoting fl
∗ for the
fraction associated with state s∗, and fl
k∗ for the fraction of states in Q(s∗) that require more that k
perturbations to leave the basin of attraction Q(s∗) (denoting the set of such states Qk(s∗)). Taking the
















is bounded away from 0 as l increases, and because αl ! 0,
µ(Q(sj))
µ(Q(s∗)) ! 0. Since there are




µ(Q(s∗)) ! 0, where recall,
Qc(s∗) is the complement of the basin of attraction of s∗.
Theorem 4 Suppose that l is large, and agents optimize imitatively according to some S 2 S. Then if
actions are substitutes, the set of stochastically stable states is a subset of fxm,xm+1,...,xNg. If actions
are complements the set of stochastically stable states is a subset of fxN,xN+1,...,xmg.
Proof: Actions are substitutes. Suppose that the system is at rest at state s = sx, where x > xN,
and consider a mutation for player i to x0 > x. (Recall that x = (x,x,...,x) and sx = (x,...,x).)
16Agent i earns a payoﬀ of πi(x,...,x,[x0]i,x...,x). Because x  xc, we have πi(x,...,x,[x0]i,x...,x) <
π∗(x), and πj(x,...,x,[x0]i,x,...,x) < πj(x,...,x,[x]i,x,...,x). Next period, the history or state
is s0 and consists of all n players playing x for l periods, n   1 players playing x in the most recent
period and i playing x0 in that period. For a player j 6= i, the payoﬀ in the most recent period is









Now, in all l+1periods x was chosen — yielding a payoﬀ of π∗(x) in l periods and πj(x,...,x,[x0]i,x,...,x)
in the most recent period. Thus, the average payoﬀ from x at state s0 is
¯ π(x : s0) =
1
l + 1










Because both [πi(x,...,[x0]i,...x)   π∗(x)] and [πj(x,...,x,[x0]i,x,...,x)   π∗(x)] are negative, the
average payoﬀ from x exceeds the average payoﬀ from x0 if:




For l suﬃciently large, this inequality is satisﬁed. Therefore, all agents revert to choosing x in subsequent
periods.
Now consider a downward deviation. In particular, let the deviation x0 be the greatest feasible action
less than x. Then, πi(x,...,[x0]i,...,x) > π∗(x) and πj(x,...,x,[x0]i,x,...,x) > π∗(x). From the same
calculations, the average payoﬀ from x0 exceeds the average payoﬀ from x if:




Again, for l large, this inequality is satisﬁed, so that all agents choose x0 in subsequent periods. There-
fore, if l is large and x > xc, then any upward movement in the action choice by any player is unattractive
according to the average payoﬀ performance criteria, but there is a downward movement that is attrac-
tive. Posed in an oligopoly context, no ﬁrst order mutation can raise output, but there exist ﬁrst order
mutations that move the system to a lower common output level by imitation.
Now consider x < xm. Any downward mutation to x0 < x by agent i leads to a lower payoﬀ than
π∗(x), and it raises the payoﬀs of other agents. Hence, in subsequent periods, agents return to x. In
contrast, a small upward mutation to x0  xm by agent i leads to a higher payoﬀ than π∗(x), and
it lowers the payoﬀs of other agents. Hence, it is adopted by everyone in the next period. But since
x < xm, even when x0 is adopted by everyone, each agent’s payoﬀ still exceeds that from x. Hence, x0
17is adopted.3
Actions are complements. The argument is similar. For x < xN, if l is suﬃciently large, a small upward
mutation by player i to x0 yields a greater average payoﬀ than x, and hence is adopted by everyone. In
turn, adoption by everyone further raises the payoﬀ from x0, so that all agents continue to play x0. In
contrast, a downward mutation results in a lower payoﬀ, and (if l is large) is below the average payoﬀ
from x, so that all agents eventually return to playing x.
For xN < x  xm, a downward mutation by i to x0 may lead to a higher payoﬀ. If it does, then it
is adopted by everyone. But then π∗(x0) < π∗(x), so that if l is large, everyone eventually returns to x.
An upward mutation by i to x0 > x results in a lower payoﬀ to i and a higher payoﬀ to others, so that
all agents again play x.
For x > xm, a small downward mutation by i to x0 raises his payoﬀ and lowers the payoﬀs of other
agents. Because x > xm, πi(x,...,x,[x0]i,x,...,x) > π∗(x) > πj(x,...,x,[x0]i,x,...,x), it is adopted.
In turn, because x > xm, π∗(x0) > π∗(x), all agents continue to play x0. Finally, an upward mutation
by i to x0 lowers his payoﬀs, and raises everyone else’s, so that i returns to x.
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